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BY WILLIAM BRATTON':'

[ have two observations to make about Holocaust and related
claims litigati on and its relation to the subject of corporate social
responsibility. JVIy perspective is that of a corporate law teacher.
First po i n t : large firms are making reparations because they c!o
business on a global basis: despite this, many of the gen e r ating forces

and events have operate d at local levels in a manner inimical to
globalist principles.

Second point: these corporations can be required to make these
reparations because their status as legal entities. which ordinarily

serves to deflect responsibility, facilit::Hes inherite d n:l�:;ability in
\VCIY th at does not obtain to human beings.

a

V/ith these two points. this reparations movement reverses our

usual expectations about multinational corporations ;.i.ncl !heir g!ob:ll
operations.

As to the first point. billions are being paid to Holor:aust cl<!ims
bo:ncls and plaintiffs ,,vithout a single one of the \v(:ll-publici?.ed
cluster of U.S. 1::-nvsuit:;; having been litigated to fin <! l judgrnent for the
pL1intiffs.
Why have all of these corporate defendants senled".'

Should

'Xe

infer that this is a spon taneo us order result a chieve d :n the globai
vem:e--'1 tri um p h

of international private ordering·) I>d the firms·
in reputation preservation. or. <llic:malivelv or
cuncomitantiv. <111 imposition of shame on them by norm<itive
e11lrepreneurs in this country and elsewhere. bri ng them to the
,.dicn<li

interest

:;t;ttlemenl table")

Certainly. moral

pressure.

applied by private

groups and government actors. and heightened by the international
------ ------S<tmucl TYler Rc,carch Prukssur of Ltw. George W<�:;hinglun Unil-�'rsitv
L111 Schnol.
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media. matters here.
But this is not just public shaming and private ordering. Law and
legal entrepreneurs wielding sticks also show up in the sequence of
events. And, significantly, they have done so for the most part at the
state and local level in the United States.
Consider the lawsuits filed in New York and California against
the Swiss banks. These were defended in part on the ground that the
Swiss

government's

appropriate forum.
August 1998.

claims

settlement

process

was

Yet the banks settled here for

the

$1.25

more

billion in

Why? Threats of sanctions, I daresay of dubious

legality, made by elected officials in the st ate of New York brought
the banks to the table,

as

did

the Senate banking

threats

in

New

York

committee, then run by another

politician,

Alfonse

D'Amato.
Not dissimilarly, the insurance claims moved from U.S. courts to
the international settlement framework by way of an agreement
among insurance commissioners from New York. California and
Florida a nd six European insurers, one of \Vhich later wi t hdr e w upon
ceasing to do business in the United States. The German process for
the compensation of slave laborers was initiated in 19Y9 with mention
of proliferating litigation here and with the final settlement originally
being contingent on dismissal of the U.S. lawsuits.

j u d icial

In contrast. actual

r u li n g s impli c ating international law. which began coming

down after 1998. have gone the defendants' way.
This all suggests a standard pu bl ic choice account of the claims
movement. The critical impetus came from pressure g r o u p s and local
politicians

anxious

to

assist

them

in

New York.

Florida, and

California. These actors worked in tandem. if not in partn,;rship. \vith
actors from the plainti ff s bar. t a rgeti n g foreign firms lacking in local
ln state-level legal and political arenas. the interests of
rluicl commerce in the global venue can cou n t for li tt l e In short. we
have had a classic hold-up in the stream of cross-border commerce.
with locals imposing themselves on foreign firms that ?.re made to
bear the cost of the hold-up in order to access the value held out by
doing business in the locality. In particular. the need ft;r access to
New York as a world financial center seems to have figured centrally
influence.

.

in the firms' vulnerability.
Not that moral imperative has not o p e r ate d also. In its absence,
New Yor k s interest in pres e nt i ng itself as <l hospitable venue for
international capital might have reasserted itself so as to change the
'

incentives of local politicians.

And, absent a moral imperative with
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negative and uncontrol labl e reputational implications, a firm would
be less quick to settle.
But I wonder what the outcome would have been had the moral
imperative operated alone, with no assist from lawyers and politicians
wielding legal sticks at a barricade blocking a crossroad of global
finance.

I also wonder how much money would be on the table had

al l outcomes depended exclusively on transnational and international
law interpreted by judges or actors from the international law
community.
Expanding, here local and global interests have conflicted, with
no Commerce Clause to force an outcome on the global side.

Here

the multinational firm goes abroad and gets slammed with l iability.
where in the usual globalization story the multinational goes abroad
to operate free of domestic regulatory constraints.
implies

irresponsibility,

whether

we

are

That freedom

talking

about

Nike

contracting to have sneakers manufactured by minors in Indonesia.
an American industrial producing in Maquiladoras free of domestic
wage l evels and labor standards, or an American firm setting a
transfer price with an Irish subsidiary so as to lighten its domestic
corporate tax burden.

II. Second Point
Note that. given the peculiarities of the corporate form. such
dubious corporate conduct tends to proceed without accountability
on

the part of any of the human actors who make the firm·s decisions.

After all, they do what they do to enhance shareholder value.
referring us to their fidelity to the shareholder interest when we
complain or negative social consequences.
that

reference

knowing

well

that

we

But. of course. they make
will

be

unable

to

fix

responsibility on their shareholder beneficiaries because the juridical
corporation
liabi!itv.

intervenes

to

shield

the

shareholders

with

limited

More than that. with dispersed shareholcling there never

emerges a human face to which moral responsibility meaningfully
might be assigned. 1t diffuses in the collectivity.

It follows that to fix a col lective responsibility

we

must take the

firm as it comes-as a firm. This can be Jess than satisfactorv. \Nhen
the fi rm commits a crime, for example, we cannot incarcerate its

corporate

personality.

constructivel y

but

meaningfully

criminal

though it may be. We can only fine it (and we may or may not find a
culpable human agent for incarceration). Thus does corporate entity

[Vul.
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status u:-;ually deflect responsibility.
lVly second point is that entity status has the opposite effect with
Holocaust claims.

Recall that fifteen and twenty years ago. the

American legal system sought corrective justice for the Holocaust by
searching out and sending home direct participants who had come
here after the war. By now such actors have passed from the scene. as
have the cu lpable actors who ran Swiss banks. continental insurers.
and German industrials during and after the War.

N ow our leg al

system seeks to compensate surviving vic ti ms (and in the case of
many awards made in the Swiss bank claims process, the descendants
and collaterals of deceased victims) while there is still time.

A case

for repar ations certa i n ly could remain powerful after the surviving
victims too are gone

-

as we see with arguments for reparations

respecting A me rican slavery.

But it would be a case unsuited to the

context of pri vate litigation and dispute resolution

.

Meanwhile. unlike the responsible human beings. there is no
danger that the corporate defendants will disappear.

The basic

attributes of corporateness-fictive legal personality. unlimited life.
and

successorship

in

the

of merger

even t

or

acquisition-keep

corporate perpc:trators present and accountable.

Not that questions could not have been raised if some of the
claims h<:�cl gone to full l itigation
The gravamen of many of the
complain ts h<:1s been unjust enrichment. Given this. one legitimately
can ask \Vll•.:.'ther Zl corporate defendant's end urance as a legal entity
.

by itself imports responsibility.

or whether a finding of present

requires a showing of institutional and owner�hip
·ro show unjust e nrichment today. one would arguably

rcspom;ibility

continuity.

have to show some tic between toclay·s economic entity and the War
�=ra entity then look value from the victims.

This manifestly aprH:ars to be the case with Swiss b anks and
Holocaust victim deposits. If. as seems likely. th e institutional woricl
of the Swiss bank is highly st<thle. roday·s banks rest on a capital bas�
as to vvhich the victims· c.kposits are as much a pan as any capit<tl
contributed prior to L950.
As between survivors or re!atiYcs or
victims ancl the b<mks' equity-holders. the former ought to have the
benefit of that capital .
The case is harder with the claim that the banks benefited from
doing busine ss with the Third Reich. acting as conduits for gold

exchanged for capital which supported the war effort and otherwise
acting as intermediaries in trade between the Reich and the outside
world. Here there may or may not be an attributable unit of capital

2UOlj
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depending on the financial particulars of those long-ago transactions.
Institutional continuity also has been disputed in the case of the
insurers, who raised postwar nationalizations in the East as defenses.
Just what those nationalizations meant in financial terms is not
immediately clear.

Here the benefit conferred is the prewar flow of

premiums. Such returns as originated in Eastern Europe may or may
not have flowed upward to the home office of a company like
Generali.

If they did, and Generali otherwise has been a stable

corporate institution. then a plausible case can be mack out.
Compare a hypothetical case-one entir ely a figment of my
imagination constructed for the sake of argument.

Suppose the

policies in question were written by a Czech company wholl y -owne d
by an Italian parent.

It was operated as a separate enti ty and its

policy proceeds were invested in a portfolio sited in Prague.

After

the War. what remained of the portfolio was subsumed into the
nationalized Czech economy.

What is the benefit conf,::rrecl on

today s Italian parent? The best one can do is look to intercorporate
"

dividend flows prior to nationalization and draw inferences.
Assume we find such a benefit flowing from Pragu,� to italy and

Now assume that tllc Jt;:llian

spin the hypothetical out another step.

insurer was closely held by a f amil y and that the family cashed out in

1948 by selli n g 100 percent of their stock to an o th e r Italian in:;urer.
The insurer becomes the purchasing comp�llly"s wholly-owned
subsidiary. But whither the benefit of the antt:cecient premium flO\\S')
The surviving firm can argue that. despite the corporate continuity.
the benefit recloundecl to the selling human equity-holders in 19-J.S.
The same point obtains if its equity is p u b licly tr<:tclcc!.
stockholdings turn

Dispersed

pass.
Onc�� they do S(J
tonfcasor firm �1rguably
disappears. There is institutional continuity. but when the question is
be nef i t conferred. an economic institution \vhose uwnershifJ does not
turn over. li k e a university or a state:: . m�d�cs �'< mure :tttr(lctiv,;
completely.

the

over as the

ownership

tie

years

to

the

clc:fcndant a half century later.

So wh ich is it-the nomin a l entity or the ccunomic :;ub:stcmcc·) If
l w e re deciding m;ltters of la\v in a H o loc a u s t claim::; cc:�se respecting
slave labor or insurance policies (the Swiss bank de po s i t s would be

easy). 1 would be inclined to discredit arguments <dong the fcr�going
lines and let liabilitv follow f rom entitv continuitv. The theorv is
simple: Corpo r ations Ztncl corporate �Ktors. having taken the
aclvm1tage of entity status Ztnd legal personality <1Cnh; the ·.::ntirc
pt:riocl. should now also be held to take the detriments l)f entity :�tatl'.S
.

.

.

:i26

Hastings lnt'l &
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I do admit that there might be an

extreme case where I would make an exception-where through
reorganizations, mergers, asset strips or whatever, the surviving firm
really only had a nominal connection with the culpable institution.
But my presumption of liability would be quite hard to rebut.

